

Villes en développement

ISTED

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Cities Through War

«... and the waste and desolate and ruined cities are fenced and inhabited» (Ezekiel XXXVI-35).

Current events alone would amply justify *Villes en développement* (VED) 's taking an interest in the cases of cities such as Beirut, Mogadishu, Kabul, Sarajevo or Grozny, whose heritage of buildings and whose populations are changing every day under the influence of war. It seems to me that these cities, continuously shaped by lasting armed conflict, testify to much deeper change: that of urban dynamics built on violence. This return to prominence of capital cities that are both ruins and crystallisations of multiple challenges and sovereignties again raises the issue of competition between territorial states and city-states. Today the change occurring in cities seems comparable to the one that befell sovereign states during the Renaissance, which French historian F. Braudel has described: such change enabled Europe's nation-states to establish themselves by monopolising armed violence, the better to impose cities.

Today, this new change of direction shows itself in the withdrawal of states from the development and management of cities in favour of local authorities and the private sector. Among other things, in both developed and developing countries, we are witnessing the privatisation and fragmentation of urban space. More and more often, this is leading to the establishment of a Mafia-like system of control and levying, of which cities living in wartime conditions are but the most extreme instance.

For some years now, several French teams of researchers into urban development have been focusing on the restructuring by violence of urban space in cities living in wartime conditions. In this issue of *VED*,



Houda Odeimi

Beirut: Fakahani next to the sports complex, August 1982.

four of these researchers have accepted to review their work : Roland Marchal on Mogadishu, Nabil Beyhum on Beirut, Fariba Abdelkhah on Khorramshahr and Christine Messiant on Luanda. Also, a few months ago, a NGO called *Patrimoine sans frontières* with the review *Urbanisme* held a symposium on the subject of «heritages in

wartime». Following this symposium, Claire Lagrange, the secretary general of *Patrimoine sans frontières*, reviews in this issue of *VED* the challenges facing the heritage of Dubrovnik and its hinterland.

Jean-Louis Venard

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
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Urban Reconstruction and Civil War : the Case of Mogadishu

At the time when Mogadishu rose up against Mohamed Siyad Barre on December 30 1990, the dictator had two nicknames: Afweyne («loud-mouth»), a reference to his propensity for systematically bleeding his country, and «the mayor of Mogadishu», a reference to his inability to keep rural areas under control and to the fact that his political legitimacy was centred only on the capital. The war did not end when he was ousted in January 1991; further incidents broke out intermittently in March, June and September. Intensive fighting started again on November 17 1991 and lasted until March 3 1992. From then onwards, armed conflict remained confined to certain parts of Mogadishu: kilometre 4, Bermuda, Medina and, during the hunt for general Aydeed by UN troops between June and October 1993, Casa Populare. To begin with, several salient facts are worth mentioning.

The first effect of war was migration into the city, although the movement sometimes continued on into the fertile areas of southern Somalia. The first wave of migrants arrived in the late 1980s, testifying to the growing insecurity in rural areas; it was followed by a second wave of migrants when war broke out, and a third one when famine decimated central and southern Somalia. These migrations gave rise to spontaneous urbanisation whose main discriminating factor was clannishness, unlike the capital's former urban structure. The 1991-1992 war accentuated the takeover of space on the basis of clan. But it must be emphasised that there were forms of solidarity that attempted to stop this polarisation in the name of a common urban identity. Although this phenomenon was by no means marginal, violence and the impossibility of guaranteeing the protection of neighbours, forced people to flee to other parts of the city. Yet, in spite of the city being split in two, the capital was not totally given over to clannishness. True, the north of Mogadishu took in several clans. But these were allies in the factional struggle. When political divisions emerged in 1994, they led to new clashes and to population movements to the south of the capital. In this section of the city, the situation was more contradictory: clan distinctions were important and hardly coincided with political or military control. Hence the greater feeling of insecurity. Urban integration, which the newcomers have been striving for since 1991, has been an unequal process certainly worth studying. Not least among those who have aspired after this new urbanity have been the combatants themselves, who arrived at the various stages of the civil war. At first, they appeared to be very divided and behaved as nomads in a world where water, food and basic consumer goods were available however little force was used. Little by little, the behaviour of combatants from

different clans became homogenised and violent confrontation gave way to temporary collaboration. By 1994, these warriors, many of whom had been incorporated into the militias set up by the factions or merchants, mutually recognised each other and shared the same ethos, which, to some extent, transcended their clan identities. They disclaimed any responsibility for the destruction and pillage of the capital but claimed that such actions had been instigated by the merchants and politicians, all of whom had been long-standing city-dwellers. War and trade go together. The role played in the war economy by humanitarian aid and by the money spent by the United Nations and charities has often been emphasised. This is justified and, given that war may break out again in Somalia, it is to be hoped that certain NGOs will not repeat the scandals that occurred in 1991 and 1992 simply to get media attention. Other relevant economic aspects of this urban reconstruction have emerged that are also worth highlighting. The internationalisation of the economy has continued, in spite of the insecurity: the markets in the historic centre of the city have moved to safer districts; today, the market in Bakara is supplied by products from a great variety of sources ranging from Abu Dhabi to Mombasa via San'a and Djibouti, India and Pakistan. In addition to the stakes outlined in this article, many others need to be elucidated. Is this urban reconstruction transitory or sustainable? If it is sustainable, what



Mogadishu: the forces in the field in 1994

political order may crystallise out of it? Is not this relative spatial segregation in contradiction with other dynamics, such as the logic of a market that is no longer held back by the apparatus of the state, or the role played by new actors on the social stage, whether militarised or not? As can be currently observed, some traditionalist or Islamist groups are trying to put forward the view that Islam could provide an alternative to the current urban structure. What social forces could support this option or the more neutral one of reconstructing a less segmented political system? ■

Roland Marchal
Researcher at the CNRS

A capital in wartime : political order and violence in Luanda

or over 30 years, Luanda has been the capital city of a country almost continuously at war; and yet it has almost always been preserved from armed conflict. The seat, symbol and prize of power in a country where its conquest remained an actively sought after military objective until the end of 1994, Luanda is both exceptional for Angola and representative of the situation in that country, perhaps its bane. The political convulsions of independence in 1975 led to the mass exodus of the Portuguese, while the permanent buildings in the city were occupied under the authority of a new political power (the MPLA) which had just vanquished two other nationalist organisations by force of arms. The influence of politics on the composition and hierarchical arrangement of urban space was reinforced when the MPLA established a so-called «Marxist-Leninist» regime, from this period some very important aspects of the population's material and social life depended on its relationship with the new government.

Then, permanent war, a history of political confrontation and the reality of the political system, were determining factors of the development of Luanda's urban society. As war was spreading through the rural areas, the capital absorbed an ever-increasing number of people from all over the country (the diversity of its population becoming one of its main distinguishing features in relation to the other towns and cities). While Angola as a whole became more and more dependent on imports (paid for by oil exports), Luanda, the main port of arrival of these imports, became the nation's centre of activity and not its main lung (it hardly contributed to Angola's circulatory system); and the regime itself turned into the reign of a soviet-style *nomenklatura* which became increasingly preoccupied with waging war and consolidating its positions and privileges. The attempts made in the first few years to implement a social policy were soon given up in favour of the de facto privatisation of «public utilities» (water, electricity, transport, etc.). Until foreigners «on business» needed to house their employees, the only new buildings that were constructed were erected by the Cubans. The refugees who flocked to Luanda settled in the *musseques* - shanty towns - situated further and further away from the city-centre. Most of Luanda's «housing stock» was controlled by the political authorities, while the private appropriation of property developed even before it was legalised. This reflected one of the effects of dollarisation and of the exaggerated growth of the «informal» economy. The latter, having developed in the shadow of the government apparatus and engrafted itself on to a failed and fictitious official economy, became the real political economy of Angola at war. Characterised by increasing illegalities, the informal economy was initially taken to by the upholders of socialism-those in power (whose luxurious life-style was more and more ostentatious), soon to be joined by «independent» traffickers. The liberalisation

of the economy initiated in the late 1980s, although unrestrained, was kept tightly under control to the benefit of the *nomenklatura* and its allies. It led to the systematisation and legalisation of this private appropriation of property and to further deterioration in the living conditions of the majority of city-dwellers.

Thus, the clientage system developed by the regime's *nomenklatura* and/or the major traffickers has had a great impact on Angola's war political economy : a large section of the urban population owes its survival to redistribution and misappropriation, which have played a vital role. Because of the war political economy, this system of extreme inequality featuring arbitrariness, a confusion of public and private property and illegality, has, at the same time, been an effective system of social control. It explains the particularly violent social relationships in the city, a violence which has been considerably aggravated by influxes into the capital of thousands of deserters and draft-dodgers «produced» by the war, whose weapons have become their main means of subsistence. At the same time, the «internal security forces» have been sinking into delinquency thanks to the impunity afforded by the «transactions» of the *nomenklatura* and the war situation.

In addition to the criminalisation of social relationships, the urban order which has emerged in Luanda has produced its own way of life and culture. It enables us to understand the changes in group identity and the shape and forms of expression of group alliances and dissensions. In particular, it enables us to understand the election results when the choice was reduced to a two-way confrontation between the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) and UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola): the ostentatious militarism of UNITA's men in Luanda, and the fear that its coming to power would inevitably call into question the existence of the stockpiling and survival networks, led the majority of the population to

view UNITA as warlike and repressive, thus ensuring its political support for the MPLA in power. So the majority of the population joined forces with the MPLA against the «intruders». The minority groups, however, who felt more or less marginalised politically, economically or culturally rejected the power of the MPLA by voting for UNITA.

Having made political capital in the elections out of UNITA's difficulty in integrating into Luanda, the MPLA government did so again after the elections: in order to prevent UNITA, which refused to accept its electoral defeat, from deploying its army in the country, and alleging that UNITA's leader (Savimbi) was preparing a coup d'Etat, the MPLA government staged a bloody «cleansing» operation (probably causing at least 2000 deaths). This operation, itself a reflection of the deterioration in social relationships, marked the appearance of two new features of the political and military confrontation: first, it was spearheaded by the police, who organised the militias, the commandos and the groups of armed civilians; second, in addition to attacks against UNITA military personnel, it gave rise to massacres of civilian UNITA members or supporters, which went beyond the bounds of political action by turning into «ethnic» killings, especially in the *musseques* (the victims being groups which had significantly voted for UNITA, i.e. the Ovimbundus and the Bakongos).

After this terrible discharge of violence by Luandans against Luandans, the capital became a haven of «peace» again. But, in fact, a decisive step towards war had been taken. This third war was to be the shortest («only» two years, from October 1992 to November 1994) but by far the most violent and the worst in Angolan history. Whereas in previous wars the inland cities had been safe havens for the rural population, they became the main stakes of the war. Luanda therefore had to take in massive new influxes of refugees in exceptionally miserable conditions: to survive, the refugees were totally dependent on

humanitarian aid. Meanwhile, the «war to end all wars» gave rise to previously unheard of levels of corruption, predation and capturing or misappropriation of government property. Luanda, on the other hand, returned to its «normal» status and life as a capital city protected from a country at war. But the «fights and massacres» of All Saints' Day had irremediably changed all political and social relationships, as shown by another «novel» event in the Angolan war: the «hunt for Zaïreans» at the end of January 1993 (causing perhaps 200 deaths?) by armed civilians including policemen. In fact, some of the people (including women) who were attacked and killed were Bakongo Angolans. The attacking and pillaging occurred simultaneously in various districts and markets of Luanda. They were «motivated» by an announcement on the radio that Zaïrean commandos had infiltrated into Angola in order to assassinate the Angolan president. The root causes of this massacre, of the hardly spontaneous pillaging of Lebanese warehouses nearly one year later, and of the exponential rise in the crime-rate, have been the build-up of social contradictions and the failure of Angola's «transition to democracy», as evidenced by the forms of identification and mobilisation that have appeared in this country.

This war, which began in bloodshed in Luanda, took some of its most «aberrant» features to their extremes in this city, i.e., beyond military pacification, ways of life totally incompatible with a pacified economic and social life. The first shiftings of urban discontent on to scapegoats are now affecting the formation of today's group identities and threaten the possibilities of pacifying and «civilising» social relationships in Luanda. The war can no longer justify the impunity of trafficking and crime. After peace agreements have been signed, a place will have to be found in Luanda for UNITA, which had been expelled from the capital by extremely violent means. The *nomenklatura* has managed to switch to new economic activities in order to protect itself from the effects of the structural adjustment measures which are about to make life more difficult for the population as a whole. So the restoration of peace is more likely to exacerbate and to lay bare the inequalities arising from the war than to correct them; it is also likely to stimulate competition and friction between the various networks of vested economic interests. In the absence of any deep moralisation of the state, Luanda risks falling victim to social decomposition and further criminalisation of social and political relationships. ■

Christine Messiant

Khorramshahr and the dialectics of national internecine strife

There is little doubt that the inhabitants of Khorramshahr saw the outbreak of hostilities between Iran and Iraq in September 1980 as a final development in the hostilities that had broken out at the end of that year's spring between Arabs and non-Arabs, or between natives and migrants, a social division which matched this ethnic split very closely. The memories of that «black Wednesday» were so bad that some people hesitated to leave the shelter of their homes, while many others had left the city. Yet these hostilities between Arabs and non-Arabs (and Persian-speakers) had precious little to do with Saddam Hussein's territorial claims. In order to understand the scope of what was at issue and not to reduce it to its communitarian aspect, we need to adopt a historical perspective.

Khorramshahr is one of 13 districts in Khuzistan province, a region bordering on Iraq. It is 135kms from Ahvaz, the province's administrative centre, and only 15kms from Abadan. For a long time, Khorramshahr was complementary to Abadan, as the oil industry's administrative centre and as a trading port, but also as a holiday resort, in contrast with its polluted oil-rich neighbour. The native population used to be made up of settled Arab tribes whose main occupation was date-growing. Khorramshahr began to expand at the end of world war II, with the arrival of migrants who turned it into a microcosm of Iran and the Gulf: the population grew very fast, and by the time war broke out in 1980 it had become the leading port in the region, despite not having deep water suitable for tankers. The newcomers built homes, set up state government machinery and ran everything. They left the natives, who were already living on the outskirts of the new town, only the prospect of being marginally integrated, notably through port-related jobs. The large, well-established traders belonged to transnational networks thanks to their family or ethnic ties. True, the city was prosperous. But almost all the locals were excluded from this prosperity. The war, of course, was awful: Khorramshahr earned itself the nickname Khuninshahr (the city of blood). The war prompted the newcomers to flee from the city; the local population split, but most of them remained loyal to Iran. The ceasefire in 1988 ushered in a period of neither war nor peace, which has lasted to this day. However, the urban situation has already changed radically.


The most notable changes have undoubtedly been the occupation by the Arab community of a significant number of city homes, often in poor condition, and the Arabs' activism

in the port-related sector, reflecting their determination no longer to play a minor role in the local economy. The tradesmen have not returned. But, having settled in large Iranian cities, they travel to trade in Khorramshahr, where their businesses used to flourish. The government's attitude has been rather contradictory. On the one hand, it has not interfered and has seemed much more intent than in the past on relying on loyalty from the locals than from migrant communities from inland: is this an admission of government powerlessness or the result of a genuine loyalty on the part of the local population? On the other hand, the city (which is situated close to a potential front line) remains under the control of the army and of the Guardians of the Revolution; nearly seven years after the end of the war there is no real local government. Many ambiguities remain. First, Abadan will no longer be the great port it used to be: its decline, which had begun during the shah's reign owing to Iraqi claims, has been confirmed and will have a really adverse impact on Khorramshahr. Next, President Rafsandjani has not granted the city the status of a customs-free area, which would have helped its economy to take off again. Finally, at the same time, all infrastructure development has been redirected to Ahvaz, showing that the central government's interest in the region and its determination to keep it firmly under control have not diminished. Moreover, the state has encouraged the formation of a new social stratum comprising entrepreneurs, architects and private-sector administrative managers, who have prospered from the financing of reconstruction projects (few of which have materialised). Like the former migrants, these experts and employees make a token appearance for a few months, picking up the many residence and risk

bonuses granted by the regime. But the state of the city does not change. Thus, over and beyond the reconstruction, other issues are at stake. In what ways should social relationships be rebuilt in the context of the city's problematic reconstruction? What relationships are being knitted together today between the communities that used to be marginalised and a central government that has certainly become aware of the regional impact of urban development? Which trading networks will these native Arabs join without always benefiting from the same support as the large, traditional, Persian-speaking traders? ■

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International study and research centre.



Claire Lagrange

A Croat village: Slano, April 1994

A heritage in wartime : Dubrovnik and its villages

A few months ago, the «Patrimoine sans frontière» association⁰ and a periodical called «Urbanisme»¹ organised a symposium on the question of «Heritages in wartime». The urban planners, architects, historians, sociologists, ethnologists and journalists attending this event based their reflection on the cities of Beirut, Herat, Sarajevo and Dubrovnik. This article highlights what is at stake in heritage terms in the context of the war in ex-Yugoslavia.

In 1991 and 1992, Dubrovnik and its hinterland were repeatedly attacked by the Serb army. The will to destroy Dubrovnik horrified people all the more as the ancient city of Ragusa had been declared a Heritage of Humanity in 1979. People felt that the Serb aggression was less a military deed than a pure barbarian act aimed at the city's historical and cultural identity, and at the civilisation it had given rise to as well as the beauty of its buildings.

Civilisation's only possible response to barbarism seemed to be to rebuild the city swiftly, in order to counteract and to challenge the aggressor; so the reconstruction was rapidly set in train, with strong support from the international community, which provided both technical and financial assistance.

A few kilometres south of Dubrovnik, the 35 villages of Dubrovacko Primorje are as worthy of care and attention as the ancient city. The fury with which Serb soldiers destroyed them proved to an absurd extreme that they too were part and parcel of this identity that the Serbs were attempting to destroy, as much as Saint Blaise's Medallion or the Palace of Festivals.

In 1994, alerted by «Des Mains sans Frontière», an NGO², «Patrimoine sans Frontière» decided to help rebuild these villages for several reasons. First, because of their

architectural quality. Next, as these villages are situated so close to the ancient city, there was a risk that the technical or financial aid would bypass them. Finally, it appeared that the required skills had been lost, and that there was a risk that in such an emergency the techniques and materials used would not be suitable for traditional constructions; it was still not too late to prevent this heritage from being paradoxically irreparably damaged by a reconstruction effort carried out with disregard for the rules of art and of architectural typology.

Another deeper reason for taking action was the fact that the strength of the proud city of Ragusa had been based on these villages, in times of both war and peace. For 30 years, this region's economy had been based mainly on tourism; in wartime, its survival would depend entirely on its ability to produce its own agricultural resources. When peace has been restored, the tourist economy's revival will be based on the region's heritage and memory. Would any traveller want to spend time visiting an amnesiac and disfigured country?

Finally, although the aim of «Patrimoine sans Frontière» is to save heritages, its aim is also and above all to work in favour of peace. The war in ex-Yugoslavia has often been partly explained as being an act of

aggression by rural and neo-urban society against the city world, resulting from a feeling of social exclusion leading to a desire to destroy what one did not have access to, i.e. the fruits of nascent capitalism, but also the cultural rewards of cosmopolitan exchanges.

Hence the vital importance of helping rural areas at war to carry out good quality reconstruction, and of providing the inhabitants of the villages with the know-how and the exchanges conducive to the imparting of the required skills. Through this process, people may become more aware of the fact that the cultural heritage, in addition to being a source of economic wealth, is also a guarantee of peace-bringing well-being. ■

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⁰ Patrimoine sans frontière: 13, bd de Rochechouart, 75009 Paris, France. Tel: (33) 1.42.80.61.67.

¹ Revue Urbanisme: 8, rue Lecuot, 75014 Paris, France. Tél: (33) 1.45.45.45.00.

See «Urbanisme» n°281, March-April 1995. See also the article by Frédéric Edelmann: «Comment réconcilier les villes martyres et leur histoire», in the newspaper LE MONDE dated February 11 1995.

² Des Mains sans Frontière, tel. and fax: (33) 1.30.52.40.73. Between five and 10 highly skilled young workers have been doing their national service in Dubrovacko Primorje since January 1994.

War and urban space in Beirut

Seventeen years of war should have caused deep physical wounds to the city of Beirut, in which tank movements, bombing by heavy artillery and air raids were followed by street-fighting in various quarters of the city, its alleyways and housing blocks.

Yet, apart from the notorious wall flaking due to spraying by machine-gun fire, which can appear suddenly anywhere in the city, and apart from a few scattered traces of impact points of anti-tank ammunition, which dug 10-centimetre wide (at the most) holes in the walls, most of the destruction is concentrated along the demarcation line, which did not move during the long war-years, and in the city-centre, where this line begins. This urban geography reflects and symbolises the civil or military war, the defensive war or the war of conquest, that shook Beirut.

The significance of this war in terms of urban space has been twofold.

1) The destruction of the city-centre, in which different communities and social classes used to co-exist, and the gateway to the city's various quarters and centres of urban life, of citizenship and of trade, has been staggering. At the time of the war, any passer-by could sense the significance of this destruction, i.e. the refusal of public spaces, of their centrality; the refusal of centrality itself.

2) The growth of the suburbs and outskirts occurred in such a way that, as early as in 1982, the surface area of the new urban districts that developed a long way from the city-centre was equivalent to the surface area of the war-damaged districts in the city-centre and along the demarcation line. Today, the surface area of the peripheral newly-developed quarters is much larger than that of the central war-damaged ones. Thus, the city has fallen back on to its fragmented, segmented and scattered outskirts on the dual pretext that, first, they are safer, because each district is inhabited by a single community, and second, that they are better equipped, because more modern.

However, this model of a decentralised city did not live on. At one time, the segregation on which it was based seemed to reflect an irrepressible urge on the part of society. But it soon turned out to be a source of unmanageable contradictions. The multiplication of the channels of distribution or of service networks finally caused a deterioration in the quality of services: electricity was available only a few hours a day; the telephone system was unusable; Beirut had literally become a garbage-city, as the municipality's decentralised sections were no longer capable of responding. In a metaphorical sense,

Beirut also became the world's garbage dump as it was isolated by a *cordon sanitaire*: Lebanese aircraft were meticulously searched at all their points of arrival and foreign airlines refused to stop off at the city's airport. Moreover, prices spiralled upwards; the currency depreciated; the stock of motor cars grew old; health services were unable to provide daily or longer-term good quality care, as they had their hands full with emergency duties; the schools and universities all too often became recruitment centres for militias and could not function normally, while closer community control of them made it more difficult to get access to universal culture; and finally, the press saw the number and quality of its publications decline. The only bright spots were the development of some pacifist movements and the amazing expansion of the audiovisual media. But, above all, violence did not cease and it seemed it would continue the process of fragmentation to levels well beyond the two territories laboriously set up during the first few years of war.

The main significance of the communitarian purification of urban space was that it expressed the principle of absolute territoriality, reinforcing a community's identity to the exclusion of all the other communities. Retreat into ghettos seemed to be the only possible answer to the contradictions of peacetime. Thus, the hatred of others and calls to murder others were motivated by principles of exclusion and segregation: neighbourhoods were no longer seen or wanted as space for close or, at least, moderately distant social relationships, but as of violent rejection of others. The political and economic logic of this fragmentation was that of the domination of the two parts of the city by those who were defending them and were part of them, and the marginalisation of those who did not want to fight and their subservience to their «defenders». These defenders set up dozens of fascist-leaning micro-territories, whose leaders were part-crooks and part-heroes taking advantage of the racist tendencies of some sections of the population. However, by dint of extortion, daily violence and humiliations, they ended up alienating even their «subjects» - those who supported the same political or religious lines - as much if not more so than their enemies. War came to mean the redefining of

urban culture - tolerance gave way to an obsession with separation -; the transforming of wealth-producing relationships - trade gave way to extortion and to parasitisation of illegal networks -; the recreating of new elites, leading ultimately to the obliteration and elimination of the middle classes to the benefit of those whom we can only refer to as the «war rich» or the «war lords».

True, each territory tried to create an alternative centrality, to become the «centre» for the other territory, unless it tried a revolution, to create a community-based society or republic. But no alternative centre was to equal the power of the former city-centre. None was to match its density (over 7,000 stores), its attractiveness, or its proliferation. For a simple reason: a ghetto is not a public space open to all; and therefore it cannot become central. But each territory was to succeed in installing a frontier in the heart of the city, separating two «natures», while, at the same time, managing to unify its urban portion with its rural portion. The domination in each territory of formerly city communities by rural or neo-urban communities is striking, and can be explained only by this dynamics of territorial reconstruction.

The war system ended up by imploding. Its very logic doomed each of the territories to tear each other apart, to turn its weapons on its own inhabitants and to recreate new demarcation lines within itself. The war ended more because the combatants were exhausted than because they were convinced that it had to end. The peace movements did not win; the militias lost. This goes a long way towards explaining the ambiguities of the post-war period: the domination by the immensely rich property developers who had returned from emigration; their imposing an urban development project that changed the population and the functions of the city-centre to be rebuilt, and featured aggressively modern architecture that repudiated the old Beirut. The changes they imposed on ownership relationships in the city-centre enabled them «peaceably» to take much further the destruction of the middle classes, of urban culture and of the population's memories than even the militias would have dared to do with all their violence. However, the ongoing public debate in Beirut is full of promise. The fact that it is going on openly and without any physical violence is a good reflection of the current pacification of minds, in spite of the radical nature of the changes in progress. But all this is another story. ■

Nabil Beyhum

◆ Research Institutes under the Responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Social Sciences and Archaeology section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Technical and Scientific Cooperation department is in charge of French research institutes abroad ; among them ten centres focus their work on space and urban management problems. Three of these have set up an «Urban Observatory» and publish their own news letter :

- The Contemporary Cairo Urban Observatory,

c/o CEDEJ, Centre de documentation économique, juridique et sociale, BP 494, M.R.C., Dokki, Cairo, Egypt.

- The Istanbul Urban Observatory,

c/o IFEA, Institut français d'études anatoliennes,

P.K. 54, 80072 Beyoglu-Istanbul, Turkey.

- The Beirut Reconstruction Observatory,

c/o CERMO, Centre de recherche sur le Moyen-Orient contemporain, B.P. 2691, Beirut, Lebanon.

It must be added the **French South Africa Institute**, doing research into «The reconstruction of space (urban, regional, territorial) and (political, social, historical) identities in post-apartheid South Africa»

IFAS, Institut français d'Afrique du Sud, Wolhuter street, PO Box 542, Newtown, 2113 Johannesburg, South Africa.

Contact : M. Michel Jolivet,

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères

Direction de la coopération scientifique et technique - STH,

244 boulevard Saint Germain, 75351 Paris 07 SP - France.

- ADP -

A seminar organised by the Association de professionnels développement urbain et coopération

8 septembre 1995 à l'ENPC
28 rue des Saints Pères 75007 Paris

Three debates were on the agenda of this seminar on the financing of urbanisation in the countries of the South : the first one was about the possible ways and means of recovering investment and operation costs ; the second debate was about the legitimacy and capabilities of local government authorities ; and the third debate was about saving and fund transfers for the benefit of urbanisation.

Contact : ADP, s/c Villes en développement...

◆ Megalopolisation of the World and Urban Diversity

Continuation of the Thursday sessions in Bondy, at Orstom, 32 av. Henri Varagnat, 93140 Bondy, France. Visual approach, semiological exploration of a city and round-table discussions on various themes:

September 28 : Delhi/Bogota, comparing the logic of megapolitan development.

October 12 : Abidjan, crossbreeding of forms and practices.

October 26 : Ibadan/Lagos, from a Yoruba form of city life to a form of urban disaster.

November 9 : The new urban economy.

Contact : Philippe Haeringer, Orstom, Mégapoles, St Roman, 26410 Châtillon-en-Diois, France. Fax: (33) 75 21 84 04

◆ Ecole nationale des ponts et chaussées. International programmes

In the second half of 1995, continuing training sessions for foreign project managers will be held. Their purpose is to enable foreigners to be aware of and to understand French know-how in the areas of urban planning, housing, construction, the environment:

. **September 25 to October 27**

«Neighbourhood Urban upgrading»

. **November 6 to 10**

«Spatial Remote Sensing and Geographical Information Systems»

. **November 13 to 24**

«Urban Services»

. **November 20 to December 15**

«Public-sector Management: Ordering and Purchasing

. **December 4 to 15**

«Functional Analysis; Value Analysis»

Contact: ENPC, Direction de la formation continue, 28 rue des Saints Pères, 75343 Paris Cedex 07, France. Fax: (33) 44 58 27 06

◆ Urbamet on the Internet

The Urbamet bibliographical database of which «Villes en développement» is one of the producers has more than 180,000 references on the urban sector in France and in developing countries. It is now accessible on the Internet.

Contact: Questel-Orbit, 55 avenue des Champs Pierreux, 9200 Nanterre, France. Tel: (33) 46 14 56 60.

Cities of the South Week

In preparing for the Habitat II Conference in Istanbul in June 1996, it is important that all those involved - the state, researchers, NGO'S, local government politicians and urban planning professionals. The aim of this week, which will be held in Paris from September 25 to 28, is to provide a forum for describing and comparing the development cooperation practices and policies of the various operators. This week will feature two different events : **The French Urban Research Conference** on developing countries organised by Orstom and Interurba on September 25 and 26 ; and the **Habitat Round-table Debate**. The week will begin with a joint inaugural session and the closing plenary session will be held on September 28.

Conference secretariat : GDR Interurba, 162 rue Saint Charles, 75740 Paris Cedex 15. Fax : (1) 45 57 50 22.

Round-table debate secretariat : Mme Anne Piguet, Commission Coopération Développement, 6 rue de Talleyrand, 75007 Paris, France. Fax : (1) 45 50 47 80.

Symposia

**October 10-20 1995,
Rabat, Morocco**

Regions and Economic Development. This symposium is being organised by the Regional Economy Centre of Aix Marseille III university and the Moroccan Ministry of Economic Development.

Contact : G. Benhayoum and M. Catin, Centre d'économie régionale, 15-19 allée Claude Forbin, 13627 Aix-en-Provence Cedex 1. Fax: (33) 42 23 08 94

**November 22-25 1995,
Dakar, Senegal**

Ocean Gateways and the Development of Inland Territories, The 5th International Conference of Cities and Ports.

Contact : Association internationale Villes et Ports, 45 rue Lord Kitchener, 76600 Le Havre, France. Fax: (33) 35 42 21 94

**February 12-16 1996,
New Delhi, India**

Urban Transport and Integrated Development. The 7th Conference on the Development and Planning of Urban Transport in Developing Countries, CODATU VII.

Contact : Association CODATU, 22 rue d'Alsace, 92300 Levallois-Perret, France.

Book Review

Silhouette urbaine: l'exemple du Caire (The Urban Silhouette: the example of Cairo), by Jean-Louis Pagès.- Paris: IAURIF, 1994.- 104 p., ill.

Written by an urban planner posted to Cairo and illustrated by his own watercolours and sketches, this book outlines the city of Cairo, revealing the features that characterise its personality and distinguish it from other large cities. The author shows how Cairo, a city with a prestigious past, is taking up the challenge of modernisation; how urban and architectural strategies are drawing the lines of its future silhouette; how the principles of urban composition have to respect each district's identity.

Price : FRF 250

Contact : IAURIF, 251 rue de Vaugirard, 75015 Paris - France.

Revue permanente du secteur urbain au Bénin. (Ongoing Overview of the Urban Sector in Bénin).- Cotonou: SERHAU-SEM, 1995.- 160 p.

This study, which claims that it has been designed to be regularly updated, presents an overview - based on data, information and analyses - of the urban sector in Bénin, with tables, charts and maps. After a description of the country's main features, this publication presents its ten main cities, local finance, land production, the legal and regulatory framework, the various policies implemented in this sector and current projects. The publication also contains a list of the major operators.

Contact : SERHAU-SEM, B.P. 2338, Cotonou, Bénin

Jardins des Villes, jardins des champs (Urban gardens, Rural Gardens). Market gardening in West Africa: from diagnosis to cure, by Valérie Autissier.- Paris: GRET, 1994.- 295 p. (Coll. Le Point sur).

The dynamism of market gardening in Africa is such as to have turned African gardens into laboratories of change. But there are also many problems. The raw material for this book was surveys showing that the main difficulties faced by market gardeners have nothing to do with agricultural techniques but rather with selling the produce, local forms of collective organisation, the management of fertility, water, land, etc.

Price : FRF 190.

Contact : GRET, 213 rue Lafayette, 75010 Paris - France.

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